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Constructing Success in the Electric Power Industry
Abstract
This paper explains the success and failure of two technologies that generate electricity from
fossil fuels. Both the Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) and fluidised bed boiler burn
fossil fuels more cleanly than more traditional technologies. Whereas the CCGT has been
used for an increasing number of new power plants during the past fifteen years, the latter has
struggled to attract attention outside a small-scale niche. The paper draws on economic and
social constructivist approaches to technical change. It shows how a combination of
economic, institutional and political factors can be used to explain success and failure. It also
demonstrates the importance of technological flexibility for the long term development of the
CCGT and its acceptance as the power industry’s current technology of choice.
Introduction
During the past decade, the UK power industry has undergone a technological transformation.
Starting in the late 1980s, the phenomenon known as the ‘dash for gas’ has led to the
construction of a large number of power stations fuelled by natural gas. These power stations
are based on a new technology, the Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT), which was
previously confined to the fringes of an industry fuelled by coal, oil and nuclear energy. The
privatisation of the UK’s electricity and gas industries changed the rules governing new
investments and triggered a wholesale switch to cheaper, cleaner CCGTs.
Whilst the dash for gas represents a particularly powerful manifestation of a global trend
towards the use of CCGTs, it is also important because of the severe effect on the UK’s deep
mine coal industry. For this industry, the replacement of traditional coal-fired power plants
and the failure of newer cleaner coal technologies to attract the attention of private sector
investors represents the latest stage in a long process of decline. Amongst these new
technologies, the fluidised bed boiler had been regarded as the coal industry’s best hope of
survival. However, despite limited progress in some parts of the world, this technology has
consistently failed to meet the expectations of its supporters.
The aim of this paper is to explain the success and failure of two fossil fuel power generation
technologies that both produce cleaner electricity than their traditional counterparts. Whilst
the reasons for the CCGT’s global triumph and the failure of the fluidised bed appear to be
relatively clear cut to current investors, this outcome was far from obvious just 15 years ago.
The key question is how the CCGT came to be in the position to take advantage of a
fortuitous combination of circumstances in a number of different countries. This question will
be examined in the light of theories drawn from the evolutionary economic and social
constructivist traditions. The conclusions of the paper will examine the wider implications of
success and failure for governments wishing to aid the development of more sustainable
energy technologies.3
Inside Two Technologies
The Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT)
The Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (or CCGT) represents a radical departure from traditional
power generation technologies. By combining two established building blocks - the gas
turbine and the steam turbine - CCGT designers have achieved electrical efficiencies which
are almost 50% higher than those of other fossil fuel power stations.
As shown in Figure 1, most CCGTs work in the following way: Fuel (usually natural gas) is
burned in an industrial gas turbine, to generate electricity and waste heat. The waste heat is
then passed into a heat recovery boiler which uses the gas turbine’s hot exhaust gases to
generate steam. This steam is then used to drive a small steam turbine and produce some
more electricity. In some cases, more than one gas turbine is used (each with its own steam
generator) in combination with a single steam turbine. However, in all modern CCGTs the
steam turbine is designed so that it produces approximately one third of the total power
output, with the remaining two thirds being met from the gas turbine(s).
Figure 1 : Schematic of a Combined Cycle Gas Turbine
Source: Author.
The most technologically advanced part of every CCGT is the industrial gas turbine. Most gas
turbine designs have been developed steadily over the last 50 years from their roots in aircraft
jet engines. Although the industrial gas turbines most frequently used in CCGTs are much
larger than the aircraft variety, they still work on the same principle. For designers, there are a
number of ways to increase the efficiency of a gas turbine and hence, the overall efficiency of
a CCGT. The traditional approach is to raise the temperature at which the combustion gases
enter the turbine. Achieving a temperature increase in this way is not difficult - the real
challenge is to ensure that the metal blades which make up the turbine do not overheat the
process. Turbine blade design is a sophisticated business requiring the use of the latest high
temperature metal alloys. At the same time, advanced casting techniques are necessary to
incorporate a network of tiny holes within the hottest blades for cooling air.4
Until recently, many of these advanced materials, casting techniques and cooling technologies
have been readily available. As one seasoned observer puts it, all the gas turbine
manufacturers had to do was ‘go shopping at the aero-engine technology supermarket’.1 This
supermarket is packed with products from the multi-billion dollar military jet engine
programmes of the US Department of Defense and their European counterparts. The newest
generations of CCGT have begun to depart from this established trajectory as designers
search for further efficiency gains. As new products such as the H System from General
Electric demonstrate (US Department of Energy, 1999), the move to efficiency levels beyond
60% will require an increasing amount of innovative thinking.
The Fluidised Bed Boiler
Figure 2 shows a simplified layout of a fluidised bed power plant. This technology gets its
name from the way in which the combustion process is managed. The fuel, together with a
sorbent for sulphur removal, is fed into a heated bed of inert material such as sand. The bed is
‘fluidised’ (i.e. made to behave as if it were a liquid) by a constant stream of air, pumped in
from below. As a consequence of this, combustion of the fuel is much more uniform and
occurs at a lower temperature than it would in a conventional boiler. The typical bed
temperature of 900° C also maximises sulphur removal and minimises NOx emissions.
Figure 2 : Schematic of a Fluidised Bed Power Plant
Source: Author.
Although the fluidised bed process is complex, the basic differences from a conventional
fossil fuel boiler are the low combustion, the fluidising air and the removal of sulphur during
                                                
1  This phrase was coined by Al Dolbec, Managing Executive, Electric Power Research Institute European
Office during an interview with the author in Birmingham, UK in November 1995.5
combustion. The latter property, together with its ability to burn a wide variety of difficult
fuels (e.g. coal processing wastes), is what really sets this technology apart from its
predecessors. The basic layout of Figure 2 shows what is known as a bubbling fluidised bed
(BFB). It is characterised by relatively low air velocities which give the bed a discernible
upper surface. Later varieties, known as circulating fluidised beds (CFBs), use higher air
velocities to propel the bed material into the upper portion of the boiler. CFB designs
normally feature an additional component, known as a cyclone, which recycles unburned fuel
back into the bed. The effect of this greater movement of the bed material is to enhance fuel
mixing and combustion efficiency.
A final development in fluidised bed technology, which has yet to be fully demonstrated
commercially, is the pressurised fluidised bed (PFB). This particular variant works in much
the same way as the others. However, the boiler is now pressurised in order to produce
exhaust gas at sufficient temperature and pressure to drive a small gas turbine. This gas
turbine is then used to generate extra electrical power. Whereas CFBs and BFBs yield
maximum efficiencies of around 38%, PFB plants offer the possibility of efficiencies of up to
42%. For all types of fluidised bed, unit sizes are limited, with maximum power outputs of
around 250MW.
An Open and Shut Case ?
There is a stark contrast between the commercial success of the CCGT and the limited
interest in fluidised bed technology. At present, 300 Gigawatts (GW) of CCGT capacity is in
operation or under construction world-wide2, whilst installations that use fluidised bed
technology have an equivalent combined output of less than 20GW3. Whilst there are large
numbers of CCGTs in many countries in Europe, Asia and North America, fluidised bed
plants are concentrated in a small number of countries. A simple economic comparison of
these two technologies using typical UK fuel prices reveals why this is the case (see Table 1).
Table 1: The Economics of New CCGT and Fluidised Bed Power Plants in the UK
CCGT (gas-fired) Fluidised Bed (coal-fired)
Capital Cost £300/kW (0.7p per kWh) £650/kW (1.6p per kWh)
Fuel Cost 18p per therm (1.1p per kWh) £28 per tonne (1.0p per kWh)
Operations & Maintenance 0.3p per kWh 0.6p per kWh
Cost of Electricity 2.1p per kWh 3.2p per kWh
Note: Figures assume 15 year payback of capital and a real discount rate of 12%.
Source: Fuel prices from Department of Trade and Industry (2000), other figures from author’s own
calculations. For further elaboration, see Watson (1997).
                                                
2  This compares to over 3000GW of installed electric power capacity world-wide (Energy Information
Administration, 2000). CCGT figures from author’s world-wide database of CCGT power plants.
3  Based on Simbeck et al, 1994 and subsequent plant orders announced in trade journals.6
Although fuel prices vary considerably between countries, Table 1 indicates that the fluidised
bed will only be economically preferable if natural gas is much more expensive than coal.
This is not often the case at present since low international coal prices are accompanied by
relatively cheap natural gas in many areas of the world (BP Amoco, 2000). Even if coal prices
are sufficiently cheap, experience shows that it is far more likely for coal-fired power plants
to use traditional boiler technology (Financial Times, 2000).
The main reason for the CCGT’s economic advantage is that the capital equipment is very
cheap to buy in comparison with most other generating options. This characteristic is
particularly appealing for the new breed of private power developers since they finance new
projects through high interest bank loans rather than their own balance sheets or State funds.
This built-in economic advantage is reinforced by the fact that CCGT construction times are
very short. New plants can be completed in under two years rather than the four to ten years
that characterise other large scale technologies. For many private investors, this further
accelerates the repayment of bank loans since their only source of revenue is the sale of
electricity.
The CCGT also has important environmental advantages that are attractive for governments
as well as investors. CCGT emissions are lower than those from other fossil fuel
technologies. A typical CCGT emits around 65% less carbon dioxide than a traditional coal-
fired power plant for each unit of electricity generated, almost no sulphur dioxide and
relatively small quantities of oxides of nitrogen (PowerGen 2000). In addition, CCGTs create
a small visual impact4, and may be sited nearer to population centres than large coal or
nuclear plants. This makes it easier for developers to secure planning permission.
Whilst these advantages provide clear evidence for the CCGT’s current popularity, they do
not explain how this technology came to be in such a dominant position. As Donald
MacKenzie (1996: 7) has argued, although hindsight may suggest that a particular technology
is intrinsically superior, it is more important to determine how this state of superiority has
come about. Therefore the search for an explanation of success needs to take in historical
perspectives on technology development.
A New Gas Turbine Paradigm ?
Jorge Islas has argued that the rise of the industrial gas turbine, the technology at the heart of
the CCGT, signals a paradigm shift for electric power generation technology. In doing so, he
takes his lead from the evolutionary economics literature (for example, Nelson and Winter,
1977; Dosi, 1982). For Giovanni Dosi, a prevailing technological paradigm ‘embodies strong
prescriptions on the directions of technical change to pursue and those to neglect’ (Dosi,
1982: 152). The selection of this paradigm and the development of a technology within it are
influenced by many economic, institutional and social factors.
                                                
4  A good illustration is the Didcot power plant near Oxford, UK. A new 1500MW CCGT is dwarfed by an
older fossil fuel plant which generates a similar amount of electricity.7
Jorge Islas asserts that the end of the old steam turbine paradigm is associated with a number
of economic, political, environmental and technological forces that have become apparent
since the first oil shock in 1973. These include the fact that ‘conventional large power stations
entered a phase of saturation (slowing of technical progress, exhaustion of scale economies,
diseconomies connected with growing complexity of systems of generation ...) [and] the
appearance of environmental constraints and nuclear security [concerns]’ (my translation
from Islas, 1995: 378). The formation of a new gas turbine paradigm has been encouraged by
‘changes in the organisation of the electricity industry inspired by economic “neo-liberalism”,
seen as a remedy to the crisis in the electricity industry, [which] permitted the entry of new
electricity producers’ (my translation from Islas, 1995: 379).
Jorge Islas’ approach leads us to conclude that an old paradigm has been abandoned in favour
of a new one. It appears to offer a convincing explanation for the success of the CCGT, a
technology at the forefront of the gas turbine paradigm, and the failure of the fluidised bed
which may be associated with the old steam turbine paradigm. Although it is certainly the
case that fundamental shifts have taken place, it is questionable whether the paradigm shift
has been so universal. Sales of traditional steam turbine power plants are still buoyant,
particularly in countries such as India and China which have access to large coal reserves
(Financial Times, 2000). The gas turbine paradigm has not yet had any impact on new coal-
fired power plants in these countries since the technologies that enable gas turbines to burn
gasified coal are still under development (Watson, 1998).
Such caveats highlight two major drawbacks of the paradigm concept. Firstly, the time at
which an old paradigm ends and a new one begins is not always easy to define. Although the
oil shock of 1973 marked a period in which many of the technological and institutional
traditions of the electricity industry were shown to have fundamental flaws, there many other
points in history which could be the start of the gas turbine paradigm. These include the start
of the ‘gas turbine age’ (Scalzo et al, 1994: 6) in the late-1960s, the transition of the gas
turbine to mass production as the jet engine after World War II, or the period in which
electricity privatisation and liberalisation were implemented in practice during the 1980s
(Watson, 1997).
The second problem that arises with the application of paradigms relates to their scope. It is
not clear whether we should be thinking in terms of a gas turbine paradigm (to succeed a
steam turbine paradigm), a small power station paradigm (to succeed a large power station
paradigm), or a cleaner technology paradigm (to succeed a ‘dirty’ technology paradigm). Each
of these cases partly characterise shifts which have already happened or those which may take
place in the future. However, the CCGT and the fluidised bed do not fit precisely into the new
and the old paradigms respectively. Therefore, as a tool to explain success and failure for this
particular case, paradigms are of limited use. Of more relevance is Jorge Samperio’s
subsequent view that the gas turbine has reversed the lock-in (Arthur, 1989) of the steam
turbine. This analysis allows for the fact that steam turbine technology is still being used in a
large number of new power plants, including CCGTs (Islas, 1997).
The Interpretative Flexibility of the Gas Turbine
Apart from the ambiguous nature of the paradigm, the main limitation of evolutionary
economics is its narrow focus. Whilst there is some consideration of ‘the role often played in
the establishment of a particular technological trajectory by public (“political”) forces’ (Dosi,8
1982: 155), the primary concern is still economics. Political forces are essentially seen as an
adjunct to the theory which are not explored in great depth, except with reference to military
and space projects. As a result, evolutionary economics does not explicitly provide a
framework which allows the influence of many different actors (primarily governments, but
also consultants, utilities, financiers, manufacturers etc.) on success and failure to be clearly
analysed.
It is therefore necessary to draw on some concepts which stem from sociological theories of
technology development, particularly the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT)
approach (e.g. Bijker et al, 1987; Bijker, 1995; Rosen, 1995). The most important
characteristic of this approach is the lack of rigid boundaries between the economic, the
social, the political and the technological. It emphasises the need for a stable socio-technical
network of interrelated actors around a new technology in order for it to succeed. As Thomas
Hughes has argued, there is a strong rationale for a network-based analysis of the electricity
industry that takes into account economic, social and political factors:
Technological systems contain messy, complex, problem-solving components. They are
both socially constructed and society shaping. Among the components in technological
systems are physical artefacts, such as the turbogenerators, transformers, and transmission
lines in electric light and power systems. Technological systems also include
organizations, such as manufacturing firms, utility companies, investment banks, and they
incorporate components usually labelled scientific, such as books, articles, and university
teaching and research programmes. Legislative artefacts, such as regulatory laws, can also
be part of technological systems. Because they are socially constructed and adapted in
order to function in systems, natural resources, such as coal mines, also qualify as system
artefacts (Hughes, 1987: 51).
For this paper, the most important SCOT concept is interpretative flexibility (Pinch and
Bijker, 1987:40), a term which explains how different groups of actors or relevant social
groups (Bijker, 1995) attach different meanings and problems to the same technology. For
example, Wiebe Bijker has observed that during the development of the bicycle, ‘the high-
wheeled Ordinary [which became the Penny-farthing] was at once a dangerous machine,
prone to failure in the marketplace, and a well-working machine that allowed highly skilled
physical exercise, resulting in a commercial success’ (Bijker, 1995: 270). The implication is
that if a technology is particularly flexible, it could support these different meanings
simultaneously. As this paper will show, key relevant social groups for the CCGT include the
power plant equipment industry, the aircraft engine manufacturers and electric utilities.
To illustrate this point, Table 2 lists the most common applications for a number of power
generation technologies, including the fluidised bed boiler and the gas turbine. The four
generic technologies shown in Table 2 have at least one application outside the power
generation industry. However, generic gas turbine technology stands out with its particularly
high degree of interpretative flexibility. To the relevant social group of the armed forces, the
gas turbine is the most efficient propulsion unit for fighter aircraft as well as Naval frigates.
The relevant social group of electric utilities sees the gas turbine as the most important
component of their current technology of choice, the CCGT. Elsewhere, the relevant social
group of oil and gas companies uses this technology for pumping gas through long pipelines
and to provide power for offshore installations. In addition, the gas turbine is also a large9
source of revenue and a strategic core technology for the relevant social groups of power
plant equipment manufacturers and aircraft engine producers.





Gas Turbine Fluidised  Bed
Boiler
Chemical processing No No No Yes
Oil and Gas Industry No No Yes Yes
Utility Yes Yes Yes Yes
Independent Power Producer Yes No Yes Yes
Weapons No Yes No No
Aircraft Propulsion No No Yes No
Ship Propulsion No Yes Yes No
Combined Heat and Power Yes No Yes Yes
Note: Two experimental nuclear aircraft engines were built in the USA during the 1960s, but perhaps
thankfully, they were never used (Sellix, 1995).
Source: Author's elaboration.
The Struggle for Acceptance
During the past 50 years, the interpretative flexibility of the gas turbine has allowed the steady
and successful enlistment of the electric utilities as a relevant social group.
The first attempt to sell the industrial gas turbine to the electric utilities began as early as the
late 1940s. However, this attempt failed because this new technology was outperformed by
steam turbine power plants which were going through a phase of rapid technical change. As a
result, the gas turbine was too small and inefficient for most electric utilities. A typical
industrial gas turbine, with an output of 5MW and a thermal efficiency of up to 20%
(Schneitter, 1953), was unable to match fossil-fuel steam plant sizes of up to 100MW and
thermal efficiencies of at least 25% (Sherry,1984).
The gas turbine equipment manufacturers responded by developing complex variants of their
designs, with theoretical efficiencies of up to 34% (Schneitter, 1953: 206). However, the few
machines that were built suffered from acute reliability problems. For the fluidised bed boiler,
the prospects of utility interest were even more remote at this stage since the idea of using this
technology for steam generation had not yet emerged (Patterson, 1978). As a result, the links
between both technologies and the relevant social group of electric utilities remained slight at
best.
Despite the lack of utility interest in the industrial gas turbine of the 1950s, generic gas
turbine technology was not short of supporters. Following the reliability problems of complex
gas turbines, the return to simple designs by the equipment manufacturers led to the10
enlistment of the oil and gas industry5. For this relevant social group, the gas turbine was not
primarily a device to generate electricity. Instead, its interpretative flexibility meant that it
was an economical means of pumping natural gas and oil through long distance pipelines.
By the end of the 1950s, the limited success enjoyed by the industrial gas turbine had
encouraged the equipment manufacturing companies to experiment with their first CCGTs.
However, the CCGT remained peripheral to their power generation business for another thirty
years. By contrast, the airborne counterpart of the industrial gas turbine, the jet engine, had
already emerged as the dominant technology for aircraft propulsion. The Korean War had
provided the incentive for the expansion of military R&D spending to levels which would be
sustained for the next forty years (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1982; Williams and Larson,
1988). In addition, the first jet powered civilian airliners had begun to enter service in Europe
and North America. The support of this network of relevant social groups allowed generic gas
turbine technology to flourish in a way that would eventually aid the enlistment of the electric
utilities by the CCGT.
Enlisting the Electric Utilities
The chain of events that eventually led to the first substantial link between the electric utilities
and the industrial gas turbine may be traced to the power blackouts in the UK and North
America during the early and mid-1960s (North American Electric Reliability Council, 1994).
These blackouts exposed the lack of provisions to cope with such emergencies within the
electricity supply grids of most industrialised countries. In the years that followed, the utilities
in these countries installed a large number of emergency gas turbines to restore electricity
supplies. The fast start-up capability of both the industrial and aircraft engine-derived variants
of gas turbine meant that they were ideal for this type of application.
Although hindsight provides evidence that the 1960s blackouts could have been predicted and
avoided, they can be viewed as a classic unpredictable historical event (Arthur, 1989). The
subsequent increase in demand for industrial gas turbines allowed the equipment
manufacturers to re-invest their revenues and improve their designs. These improvements,
which yielded increases in unit size and efficiency, provided the utilities with increasing
returns from their adoption of the gas turbine. It is this process which eventually led to the
emergence of the CCGT.
The most important consequence of the 1960s power blackouts is the establishment of a vital
lead for gas turbine technology over the fluidised bed for power generation applications.
Although the idea of using fluidised bed boilers for steam generation (and, by implication,
power generation) emerged during this decade, the amount of practical development work
remained small until the mid-1970s (Patterson, 1978). By this time, the first CCGTs had been
constructed in the USA.
                                                
5  From interviews with employees of equipment manufacturers and evidence from manufacturer reference
lists of historical gas turbine sales.11
Once the electric utilities had become more familiar with their new gas turbines, it was much
easier for the equipment manufacturers to incorporate larger versions of these machines into
CCGT plants. Indeed, some of the American equipment manufacturers reported that the
electric utilities began to enquire about gas turbines for continuous rather than emergency
service6. At this point, the interpretative flexibility of this technology was vital since it
allowed the manufacturers to import advanced materials and cooling techniques from the jet
engine in order to scale-up their designs to a useful size. The advent of gas turbines with
capacities of over 50MW allowed the construction of 100MW CCGT blocks which operated
with a thermal efficiency of around 40% (for example, Maslak and Thomson, 1994). Several
of these blocks could be constructed side by side in order to form a medium-sized power
station that matched the efficiency of contemporary steam turbine power plants.
This combination of factors led to the enlistment of the first batch of electric utilities by the
supporters of the CCGT. Many of the first orders were placed in the USA, where a bubble of
cheap natural gas had improved the economics of gas-fired power.7 In addition, General
Electric (GE) and Westinghouse were technologically better placed than the European
manufacturers as a result of their current and previous aircraft engine connections. At the
same time, the fluidised bed boiler finally became attached to the same socio-technical
network with the construction of the first demonstration plants for electricity generation in the
UK and the USA (Patterson, 1978).
Temporary Interest in the Fluidised Bed Boiler
The new wave of interest in the CCGT as a power generation option did not last for long. Its
end, like its beginning, was precipitated by an unpredictable historical event. This time, it was
the decision of the Middle-Eastern OPEC nations to quadruple their oil prices which had a
large impact on the CCGT since it was accompanied by a sudden increase in natural gas
prices (Flavin and Lenssen, 1995). The problems of the CCGT were subsequently
compounded by a number of serious reliability problems which affected the newly scaled-up
industrial gas turbines (Bechtel, 1980).
For the fluidised bed boiler, the 1973 oil shock represented a much needed boost to its
prospects. An attitude of indifference amongst relevant social groups such as governments,
utilities and large boiler makers was replaced by a growing interest. Faced with the twin
problems of high oil prices and localised environmental pollution, governments and
equipment manufacturers in North America, Europe and Japan began to look at ways of
burning coal more cleanly and efficiently. Since fluidised bed technology offered the prospect
of fulfilling the first (and perhaps the second) of these criteria, a number of demonstration
projects were initiated (Patterson, 1978).
                                                
6 Comments by Malcolm Jarvis, Applications Engineer, GE Power Systems, Egham, UK during an interview
with the author in March 1995.
7  Comments by Douglas Todd, Manager, Combined Cycle Programmes Marketing, GE Power Systems,
Schenectady, NY, USA during an interview with the author in November 1995.12
The fluidised bed was not the only beneficiary of the new public R&D programmes. These
programmes also included ambitious plans to develop high efficiency industrial gas turbines
and jet engines, some of which eventually yielded CCGT improvements.8
By the late-1970s, utilities had formed an attachment to both of our two technologies, though
the extent of this attachment was still weak. Although the demand for gas-fired power had
almost disappeared outside the Middle East, the CCGT’s position remained much stronger
than that of the fluidised bed. The existence of a significant number of plants in commercial
service in the USA and Europe, together with the strong network of relevant social groups
that were continuing to support the jet engine, placed this technology in a strong position for
the future. By contrast, the fluidised bed boiler was set to remain a demonstration technology
for several more years despite the support of some governments, large boiler makers and
utilities.
Success is Confirmed
Although the first oil shock appeared to signal an abrupt end to the new gas turbine age, the
development of the CCGT continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Trends in capital costs,
environmental performance and reliability combined to increase the advantages of the CCGT
over the alternatives. Whilst the performance of traditional technologies did not improve
substantially, the CCGT of the late 1980s was substantially more attractive than its
predecessor of the early 1970s. Even though orders for gas turbines and CCGTs remained
scarce until the end of this period, the CCGT was well placed by the time that oil prices fell in
1986. Faced with such rapid improvements the fluidised bed boiler was left behind, even
though its supporters made considerable progress in terms of unit size and reliability.
Figure 3 shows a comparison of typical fossil-fired steam plant capital costs with those of a
CCGT between 1970 and 1995. The figures, which are all taken from estimates under
conditions in the USA, have been adjusted to year 2000 prices.
                                                
8  Comments by Harold Miller, Manager – Technology Programmes, Advanced Technologies, GE Power
Systems, Schenectady, NY, USA during an interview with the author in November 1995.13
Figure 3: Capital Costs of the CCGT and Conventional Coal-fired
Power Plants in the USA (1970-1995)
Note: All figures are approximate, for plants 300-500MW, and are adjusted to year 2000 prices
Source: Authors elaboration from journal articles and interviews with equipment supply companies.
Since 1980, there has been a substantial increase in the capital costs of conventional fossil-
fired steam plants whilst the cost of a typical CCGT has actually fallen slightly. According to
some estimates, the cost of a typical large coal-fired station has escalated by 20% as a result
of the need for flue gas scrubbers and cooling towers (Joskow and Rose). Although they
appear to be large, these cost escalations are not as substantial as those for nuclear power
stations (e.g. MacKerron, 1992). The reasons for the downward trend in CCGT costs may be
traced to the intense competition for orders within the heavy electrical industry as well as
rapid advances in thermal efficiency.9
During the period of time covered by Figure 3, the maximum size of fluidised bed power
plants was increased from less than 10MW to 250MW (European Commission, 1996).
Although historical capital cost data is difficult to locate, it is possible to conclude that the
fluidised bed failed to outperform traditional fossil-fired steam plants in economic terms. The
early fluidised beds that were constructed in the USA following the introduction of the Public
Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 featured an economic advantage over a traditional coal-
fired plant with flue gas desulphurisation to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions. It was at this
time that interest rose in this technology as a way of burning coal and other polluting fuels
                                                
































whilst minimising emissions. However, this advantage was soon lost as the proponents of
traditional boiler technology fought back.10
As well as increasing the comparative economic advantage of the gas turbine and CCGT, the
equipment manufacturers also had to restore utility confidence in the reliability of their
designs. Attitudes during the mid-1970s were typified by one utility executive who is reported
to have said that ‘the only good gas turbine is one that doesn’t have to run’ (Moore, 1988). If
the relevant social group of electric utilities were going to be encouraged to renew and
strengthen their attachment to the CCGT once the fuel price situation changed, the image of
this new technology would have to be improved.
Despite this dismissive attitude from some quarters, the utilities played a crucial role in the
improvement of reliability, particularly through the efforts of the Electric Power Research
Institute in the United States (Della Villa et al, 1989). When oil and gas prices fell in 1986,
their reluctance to embrace CCGT technology did not last long because the steady efficiency
improvements implemented by manufacturers began to yield substantial economic benefits.
These benefits have outweighed concerns about reliability even though some newer CCGT
designs have suffered from significant technical problems (Watson, 1998). Asian utilities
such as the Tokyo Electric Power Company and the Electricity Generating Authority of
Thailand were the first to recognise the CCGT’s potential. They were accompanied by the
new breed of independent power companies in the UK and the USA, who were keen to use
the CCGT as a way of entering newly liberalised electricity markets.
Powerful Relevant Social Groups
Whilst the evidence presented so far shows how the CCGT eventually enlisted electric
utilities and independent power companies through its interpretative flexibility, an exclusive
focus on these relevant social groups misses out some important ingredients of success. This
paper has already alluded to the influence of other relevant social groups on success and
failure, namely the power plant equipment manufacturers and various government agencies.
Before bringing the analysis to its conclusion, it is important to acknowledge the power of
these relevant social groups to shape success and failure. SCOT approaches to technical
change have already addressed the issue of power in previous empirical case studies. In his
social construction of the fluorescent light bulb, Wiebe Bijker introduced power ‘to account
for the obvious differences in economic power between some of the relevant social groups ...
[including] Mazda companies [a lighting cartel], utilities, independents, consumers, fixture
manufacturers, and the government’ (Bijker, 1995: 267).
                                                
10  This pattern of behaviour fits the observation by previous authors that the supporters of the normal
technology will innovate in order to stave off the challenge of a new competitor (Constant, 1980; Von
Tunzelmann, 1986a and 1986b).15
The International Equipment Companies
The world’s dominant manufacturers of equipment for electric power plants have been in
existence for over 100 years. Companies such as Siemens of Germany and GE of the USA
were founded by electricity industry pioneers during the late 19
th century. For at least the first
sixty years of its existence, the heavy electrical industry operated through a series of cartels.
These included the famous Phoebus electric lamp cartel of the 1920s and the International
Electrical Association which acted as a cartel for at least 40 years from the mid-1930s (US
Congress Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 1980). Illegal activities such as
price fixing and market allocation were common within these cartels, as were more legitimate
associations through product licensing agreements. As a result, the heavy electrical industry
has always been a financially strong and powerful relevant social group for the technologies it
championed.
One of the defining features of the dominant companies within heavy electrical industry is
their strong technical competencies in the area of turbine design (Constant, 1980). Companies
such as GE, Westinghouse and Siemens were the first to take up the steam turbine following
its invention by Charles Parsons in 1884. They were also heavily involved in the jet engine
development programmes during and after World War II, and were the first companies to
develop the land based gas turbine as a new electricity generation technology. The turbine-
based competence of these companies meant that they were able to subsequently develop and
sustain an interest in CCGT design and manufacture.
The success of the dominant heavy electrical industry firms in commercialising turbine-based
technologies such as the CCGT contrasts sharply with their general lack of interest or skills in
boiler equipment manufacture. As one manager from GE explained, his company felt that
there ‘was very little unique contributed value in putting together a bunch of tubes and putting
a shell around it’.11 In fact, the first efforts of gas turbine manufacturers such as GE and
Westinghouse to build heat recovery boilers for their CCGTs were a disaster, and they soon
contracted out this activity (Bechtel, 1980). Similarly, their performance in the construction
of nuclear steam generators was much weaker than rival boiler makers like Babcock and
Wilcox and Combustion Engineering (Thomas, 1988).
The upshot of this technical specialisation is that the largest power plant equipment
manufacturers only showed limited interest in new boiler-based technologies such as the
fluidised bed. Instead, this technology was developed on the sidelines by a number of small
and medium-sized boiler makers, and was only picked up by larger equipment companies as a
by-product of industry take-overs during the 1980s and 1990s. Whilst the CCGT emerged as
the fastest developing power plant technology with a global market share approaching 50%
(Financial Times, 2000), the boiler makers became less and less technologically important.
Although orders for power station boilers have continued, the CCGT boom has strengthened
the position of the big four heavy electrical industry companies (GE, Siemens-Westinghouse,
Alstom and Mitsubishi) at the expense of the boiler makers.
                                                
11  Comments by Jim Corman, General Manager, Power Generation Systems, GE Power Systems, Schenectady,
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A Political Economy of Technology Choice
Governments and their agencies influence the success and failure of energy technologies in
many different ways, some direct and some indirect. In doing so, governments can comprise
several relevant social groups which become linked to a particular technology for a variety of
different reasons. The UK dash for gas provides a good illustration of some of these links. As
stated earlier, the dash for gas led to the rapid diffusion of CCGT technology within the UK
electricity industry starting in the early 1990s. This phenomenon is particularly relevant here
since it confirms Wiebe Bijker’s observation that the ‘stabilisation of artefacts is a social
process and hence subject to choices, interests, and value judgements - in short, to politics’
(Bijker, 1995: 281).
In the early 1990s, parts of the UK government acted as particularly powerful relevant social
groups for the CCGT. Their clearest influence can be traced to the privatisation and
liberalisation of the electricity supply industry which began in 1989 (Surrey, 1996). Strong
government support for privatisation and the development of competition led to the
encouragement of independent power producers to challenge privatised generating
companies. As this paper has already illustrated, the post-privatisation financial climate gave
strong incentives for power companies to choose CCGT technology for new power plants.
However, obstacles remained to new entry based on CCGTs due to legislative restrictions on
the use of natural gas as a power station fuel. The government Minister responsible, Cecil
Parkinson, chose to overrule both UK and European laws to allow the first batch of CCGT
stations to be built (e.g. Young, 1988). As a fortuitous by-product of the CCGT’s popularity,
the government was subsequently able to meet its international commitments to curb
emissions of carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide without the need for further intervention
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2000).
Alongside the government’s economic and environmental reasons for encouraging the dash
for gas, there was a deeper political motivation for its actions. Following their return to power
in 1979, a key part of the Conservative Party’s agenda was the desire to curb trade union
power in the aftermath of the 1978-79 ‘winter of discontent’ (Milne, 1995: 8). Since the UK’s
coal mining union (the National Union of Mineworkers or NUM) represented the more
militant strand of trade unionism, it became the primary target of government efforts. Even
though the power of the NUM was severely diminished following the strike of 1984-85, the
dash for gas may be seen as a convenient way to weaken its influence in the UK energy
system.
This additional ideological driver helps to explain why the shift in favour of the CCGT in the
UK has been much more pronounced in the UK than in other countries. It also partly accounts
for the continued absence of the fluidised bed and other cleaner coal technologies from the
UK power generation scene. In other industrialised coal producing countries such as Germany
and the USA, the switch to gas has not been so rapid and the fluidised bed boiler has made a
limited impact.12 Whilst the UK government relevant social groups were not dominated by
people who were positive advocates of the CCGT, they became firmly linked to this
                                                
12  Data from SPRU CCGT database and from fluidised bed manufacturer reference lists.17
technology by default. To use the terminology of Bruno Latour (1991: 104), the UK
government was translated to support the CCGT due to the combined effect of the
Conservative Party’s agenda of economic liberalisation and its crusade against trade union
power. In the light of these considerations, it is not surprising that the introduction of
competition into the electricity was carried out in a way that was extremely detrimental to the
coal industry. In addition, it is now clear why the UK dash for gas was allowed to continue
unabated until the Conservatives left office in 1997.13
Conclusions: Government, Technology and Sustainability
This paper has shown why one power generation technology has become a world-wide
success, whilst another equally promising technology has failed to make an impact. Although
the reasons for the CCGT’s popularity are clear under current economic conditions, it is less
apparent how this technology came to be in such a position of strength. The explanation for
its ascendancy involves a complex array of factors. It has been shown that the economic
dimension of the CCGT’s development provides insufficient evidence for its success.
Substantial weight must also be given to the structure of the electricity and power plant
equipment industries, the role of unpredictable events and political motivations particularly
within the UK government.
At the heart of the explanation of success and failure lies the interpretative flexibility of the
gas turbine, the most important CCGT component. This flexibility has allowed the gas
turbine to develop rapidly, first as the aircraft jet engine and subsequently as a power source
for the oil, gas and electricity industries. Through the application of jet engine technology to
land-based gas turbines and improvements in reliability, the relevant social group of electric
utilities was enlisted as a strong supporter of the CCGT in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Whilst some fluidised bed boilers have been built as a result of stringent environmental
regulations in a few countries, its position has been undermined by the arrival of cheap
natural gas.
In conclusion, it is important to examine the implications of success and failure for future
government policies, particularly those for the encouragement of more sustainable energy
technologies. The experience of government support for new energy technologies suggests
that the most direct policy options - particularly R&D funding – do not necessarily lead to
commercial success. In face, much of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion - that the
success or failure of a given technology has little to do with government R&D funding of it.
Examples of failed State-funded technologies include the fast breeder nuclear reactor (Keck,
1988) and the supersonic passenger aircraft (Nelson and Eads, 1972).
The axiom that government funding and success have little in common would appear to be
supported by the cases of the CCGT and fluidised bed. Whilst the fluidised bed boiler has
benefited from considerable public financial support, most notably from the US government
                                                
13  Following its election in 1997, the Labour government introduced a partial moratorium on consents for new
CCGT power plants (Department of Trade and Industry, 1998). This moratorium is expected to be lifted in
early 2001.18
(US Department of Energy, 2000), it has not become a mainstream technological option. By
contrast, the conventional wisdom with regard to the CCGT is that it was developed by
private companies in response to demand for a cheap, environmentally friendly and trouble
free source of electrical power.14
Although this particular contrast between the CCGT and the fluidised bed boiler reflects
some of the truth, this paper has revealed a more complex picture. The close link between the
gas turbine and the aircraft jet engine means that the current generation of CCGTs have
benefited from billions of dollars of public R&D support (e.g. Mowery and Rosenberg, 1982).
As a result of the military jet engine connection, the armed forces and defence agencies of
many countries comprise a particularly powerful relevant social group for the gas turbine and,
by implication, for the CCGT. Similarly, some observers are of the opinion that the most
successful designs of fluidised bed were developed by private companies with a minor role
played by government programmes.15 However, the fluidised bed has not benefited from
obvious State-sponsored spin-offs due to its lower degree of interpretative flexibility.
The implications for governments wishing to support the development and use of more
sustainable energy technologies are complex. The cases of the CCGT and fluidised bed do not
give any encouragement to those who advocate ‘do nothing’ governments - governments
which provide minimal direct support for the development of new technologies and those
which prefer to leave such matters entirely to the market. It has been shown that it is highly
unlikely that the CCGT would have been a success if it had not been helped by billions of
dollars of government money through military budgets. It has also been established that the
fluidised bed boiler has failed despite considerable public financial commitments, particularly
from the US government.
Such unpredictable effects reinforce the conclusions drawn by previous studies (e.g. Kemp et
al, 1997; Stirling, 1994) that a government strategy that supports a diverse range of
technologies is likely to be the most effective. Along with other evidence presented in this
paper, these effects also add weight to the view that technologies are not developed from
concepts to commercial successes in a linear or path dependent way. Rather, they are the
result of complex interactions between various relevant social groups which have to be
enlisted as part of a new, stable socio-technical network.
Even though new technologies may seem to be practically feasible as well as more
sustainable, there are often large barriers to their adoption. For example, the relevant social
group of electric utilities may not be interested in solar cells because they are too small, too
expensive or too novel. Alternatively, the power plant equipment industry - a relevant social
group that dominates the power generation equipment market - may be impossible to enlist
because they do not have the competencies or the inclination to adopt a given technology. The
fluidised bed boiler is a case in point. In view of these potential barriers, it is not enough to
provide lists of technological possibilities with an exhortation to use them simply because
                                                
14  This perception is particularly widespread amongst electric utilities, financiers and regulators (Watson,
1998).
15  Personal communication from Jason Makansi, Editor in Chief, Power, New York, USA, 11
th April 1995.19
they are more sustainable as von Wiezsacker et al (1997) have done. Instead, mechanisms
have to be devised which allow confidence to be built amongst the various parties and the
establishment of new socio-technical networks, whilst allowing for the fact that some
technologies will not be taken up and others will be the subject of unexpected interest. A
partly successful example of such a mechanism is the UK’s Non Fossil Fuel Obligation
subsidy for renewable energy technologies (Mitchell, 1994).
Finally, from the perspective of the UK, it is easy to hold the view that revolutionary
structural change is always necessary to alter established technological habits. Since the
abandonment of traditional coal-fired power plants in favour of the CCGT has also led to
dramatic reductions in the UK electricity industry’s environmental impact, it is equally easy
to conclude that such an upheaval is a pre-requisite for a shift towards a more sustainable
energy system. However, the evidence from outside the UK contradicts this view. For
example, the large Japanese utilities have adopted the CCGT even though they are private
monopolies. They have also reduced the environmental impact of their existing fossil-fuel
power plants through an extensive programme of flue gas desulphurisation and
denitrification. Elsewhere, the State-owned monopoly utilities of South Korea, Indonesia and
Thailand have also built large numbers of CCGTs. Therefore a radical change in the structure
of the electricity industry is not a necessary condition for the success of the CCGT. If this
conclusion were generalised to other technologies, it would mean that more sustainable
options can thrive within existing institutional structures.
Whilst it is may not be necessary to privatise (or even liberalise) the energy industries to
encourage sustainability, some of the technologies to help combat global climate change
could ultimately originate outside the established socio-technical network. Unless all of the
power equipment companies follow the example of the Swiss Swedish company, ABB, and
jettison their interests in traditional energy options, the progress of many new technologies
may be very slow. It would appear that there is still a lot to be learned from the actions of the
US government 55 years ago. Instead of giving their newly acquired jet engine to the existing
piston aircraft engine suppliers, the US Airforce decided to involve the steam turbine
manufacturers - manufacturers which did not have a vested interest in blocking the progress
of this revolutionary new technology.20
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